Hussman Market Comment

The simplest thing that can be said about current financial market and banking conditions is this: the unwinding of this Fed-induced, yield-seeking speculative bubble is proceeding as one would expect, and it’s not over by a longshot.

The extreme “tail” risk ahead may be disorienting. While nothing in our discipline relies on valuations to retreat anywhere near their historical norms, we view a market loss on the order of -60% as likely. The February comment examines profit margins, interest rates, monetary policy, growth, and the composition of the S&P 500. All of these have been used as ways to “justify” today’s elevated valuations, and all of them are problematic.

The problem with speculation is that there’s usually a gap between the underlying risk and the inevitable outcome. The gap is most dangerous when there are potential rewards for pushing your luck.

Whether we examine the projections of Wall Street analysts, or the pricing behavior of options traders, investors seem to have ruled out tail-risk - the risk of extreme market losses. Both of have historically behaved as contrary indicators.

Valuations are the “weighing machine” and provide information about likely long-term investment returns and the potential extent of market losses over the completion of any market cycle. Market internals are the “voting machine” and provide information about speculative versus risk-averse investor psychology. Presently, both the weighing machine and the voting machine point in the same direction. That will change. Until it does, ignoring them is a mistake.

Value is not measured by how far prices have declined, but by the relationship between prices and properly discounted cash flows. When the cash flows are very long-term in nature, and the deviation from median historical valuations is extreme, simply attaining those run-of-the-mill valuation norms can imply seemingly preposterous losses. Then the market suffers seemingly preposterous losses anyway.

There’s no question that Fed-induced speculation encouraged investors to chase extreme valuations, and to accept low returns on every class of investments. Unfortunately, Fed policy does not change the arithmetic that links valuations with subsequent returns. By our estimates, the S&P 500 is likely to lag Treasury bonds, and even Treasury bills, for more than a decade. Now comes the hard part.

What drives investment returns? Can you simply buy stocks at any price and assume you'll enjoy long-term returns on the order of 10% annually? The answer is no. Unfortunately, the financial industry often encourages investors to imagine this is how markets work. Is there some meaningful structure that drives returns? The answer is yes. Understanding it offers clear insights about how we got here, and where we may be going.